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Fundamental Rights in Europe after Opinion 2/13
The Hidden Promise of Mutual Trust
    
Introduction
Like a glamorous celebrity couple whose marital happiness glossy maga-
zines treat with fascination, the relationship between the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) continues to intrigue legal academia. The significant
overlap between the jurisdiction of both courts would ordinarily be a
recipe for judicial skirmishes,1 a risk that has only increased in recent
years. While the CJEU has long reviewed European Union acts in the
light of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the adop-
tion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a binding instrument2 in
2009 has complicated things further. Human rights adjudication now is
no longer a sideshow but the CJEU’s core business,3 exacerbating the risk
The authors are indebted to Christine Landfried and Bruno de Witte for their incisive
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
1 See, generally, Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribu-
nals (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
2 According to Article 6(1) TEU, the European Union “recognizes the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of
7 December 2000, as adopted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the
same legal value as the Treaties.”
3 G. De Búrca, “After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a
Human Rights Adjudicator?,” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 20
(2013), 168–184; T. Tridimas, “Fundamental Rights, General Principles of EU Law, and
the Charter,” Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 16 (2014), 361–392
[362–364]; S. Douglas-Scott, “The Court of Justice of the European Union and the
European Court of Human Rights after Lisbon,” in S. de Vries, U. Bernitz, and
S. Weatherill (eds.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after Lisbon (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2013), pp. 153–180 [158].
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of conflicts with the ECtHR.4 Yet, in contrast to the knee-jerk reactions of
certain state constitutional courts at the prospect of losing business to
Luxembourg,5 the ECtHR has continued to put a premium on judicial
dialogue. Even though the CJEU’s adverse opinion6 on the European
Union’s accession to the Convention came as “a great disappointment” to
the Strasbourg court,7 the relationship between both supranational courts
continues to be characterized by mutual trust and cross-fertilization.
This contribution takes a closer look at this productive partnership
and asks whether the existing legal framework guarantees the endurance
of the cooperative dialogue between both courts. First, it summarizes the
ground rules of their symbiosis, going over the Convention’s status in
European Union law and the ECtHR’s recognition of the European
Union’s legal personality. Then, it briefly addresses the impact of Opin-
ion 2/13 on the European Union’s accession to the Convention before
exploring, in section 3, the many forms that the judicial dialogue between
the CJEU and the ECtHR has taken over the years and discussing the
4 C. Eckes, “EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation,” The Modern
Law Review 76 (2013) 254–285 [280]; H. Porsdam, From Civil to Human Rights: Dialogues
on Law and Humanities in the United States and Europe (Cheltenham, UK, and North-
ampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2009), p. 102. Describing how such conflicts might arise, see,
e.g., H. J. van Roosmalen and A. Pahladsingh, “Het Handvest van de grondrechten van de
Europese Unie: beweging in de rechtspraak,” NtER (2013) 3, 83–92 [86]. At the same time,
Article 52(3) of the Charter intends precisely “to ensure the necessary consistency between
the Charter and the ECHR” (Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights,
OJ [2007] C 303/33) by defining the scope and meaning of fundamental rights in relation
to the Convention and by referring to the level of protection set by the ECHR as European
Union minimum standards.
5 Procedurally, there was the introduction of the question prioritaire de constitutionalité in
three different European Union member states, which was ruled incompatible with Article
267 TFEU: CJEU, Order of 1 March 2011 in Chartry, C-457/09, EU:C:2011:101 (Belgium);
CJEU, Judgment in Melki and Abdeli, C-188/10 and C-189/10, EU:C:2010:363 (France);
Judgment in A and B, C-112/13, EU:C:2014:2195 (Austria). Substantively, tensions
between the CJEU and the national constitutional courts ran high in the context of the
European Arrest Warrant. See in particular the Judgment in Melloni, C-399/11, EU:
C:2013:107. See A. Pliakos and G. Anagnostaras, “Fundamental Rights and the New Battle
over Legal and Judicial Supremacy: Lessons from Melloni,” Yearbook of European Law 64
(2015), 97–126; D. Thym, “Separation versus Fusion: How to Accommodate National
Autonomy and the Charter? Diverging Visions of the German Constitutional Court and
the European Court of Justice,” European Constitutional Law Review 9 (2013), 391–419.
6 CJEU, Opinion 2/13 (“Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on
Human Rights”), EU:C:2014:2454.
7 D. Spielmann, “Foreword of the President of the ECtHR,” Annual Report of the European
Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg: Registry of the European Court of Human Rights,
2014), p. 7.
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influence of the jurisprudence of one over the other. A final part relies on
the notion of systemic integration to argue that the cooperation between
both courts goes beyond voluntary comity and amounts to a legal duty.
Jurisdictional Overlap
While the two courts belong to discrete legal orders, they are “forced to
confront each other’s existence”8 in several ways. The European Union is
not bound by the Convention as a matter of international law because it
is (still) not a party to it.9 Yet, because all European Union member states
are party to it,10 the CJEU has traditionally considered the rights con-
tained in that treaty as principles common to the constitutional traditions
of the member states and, for that reason, general principles of European
Union law.11 By doing so, the Court sought to avoid early on that
member states violate the Convention by complying with European
Union law or that they jointly incur Convention responsibility for the
acts or omissions of their supranational agents, the European Union
institutions. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty has codified this long-standing
8 Douglas-Scott, “The Court of Justice of the European Union,” p. 157.
9 As the CJEU put it in its judgments in Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105,
para. 44) and Kamberaj (C-571/10, EU:C:2012:233, para. 62) the Convention “does not
constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which
has been formally incorporated into European Union law. Consequently, European
Union law does not govern the relations between the ECHR and the legal systems of
the Member States, nor does it determine the conclusions to be drawn by a national court
in the event of conflict between the rights guaranteed by that convention and a rule of
national law.” See also CJEU, Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, para. 179.
10 It seems clear that being party to the ECHR is one of the so-called Copenhagen criteria
listing the conditions for European Union membership. See in particular the Joint
Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, OJ (1977)
C 103/1, which were confirmed by the European Council at Copenhagen on June 21 and
22, 1993 (6 EC Bull. [1993], point I.13) and are now referenced in Article 49 TEU. See K.
Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, and N. Cambien (ed.), European Union Law (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 92–93 and 828.
11 See CJEU, Judgment in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, EU:C:1970:114, para. 4
and Judgment in Nold v. Commission, 4/73, EU:C:1974:51, para. 13. In more detail, see
Lenaerts et al., European Union Law, pp. 826–829 and B. de Witte, “Community Law and
National Constitutional Values,” LIEI (1991), 2, 1–22. While the European Union
Charter is now the Court’s main source of fundamental rights, general principles of
European Union law have not lost all relevance, see Tridimas, “Fundamental Rights,”
pp. 378–379 and H. Hofmann and C. Mihaescu, “The Relation between the Charter’s
Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Adminis-
tration as a Test Case,” European Constitutional Law Review 9 (2013), 73–101.
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jurisprudence in the Treaty on European Union, introducing a formal
reference to the Convention in the treaties.12 According to said jurispru-
dence, the ECHR is binding on the European Union institutions and on
member states when they are acting within the scope of Union law.13
The upshot of this is that even though the European Union is not a party
to the Convention, the CJEU applies (and interprets) the rights contained
in the Convention, using them as a yardstick for legality review. In sum,
the Convention has been fully integrated not just into the laws of the
member states but also into European Union constitutional law.14
The effect of the Convention and ECtHR case law in the European
Union legal order therefore remains a matter not of international but of
domestic law – European Union law.15 This is particularly clear now
that the Union has a binding fundamental rights catalogue of its own that
explicitly addresses its relationship to the Convention. In Article 52(3),
the Charter creates an “interpretive bridge”16 between the European
Union fundamental rights regime and the Convention, stipulating that
12 See Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, which became Article 6(2) TEU post-Amsterdam
(1997) (“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States, as general principles of Community law”). The Lisbon Treaty,
which entered into force on December 1, 2009 moved the provision to Article 6(3) TEU
and slightly amended its formulation.
13 As Advocate General Sharpston observed in her opinion in Bartsch (C-427/06, EU:
C:2008:297, point 69), this means that the national measure at issue must (1) implement
EU law – irrespective of the degree of discretion the member state enjoys and whether the
national measure goes beyond what is strictly necessary for implementation; (2) invoke
some permitted derogation under European Union law, as in the Judgment in ERT, 260/
89, EU:C:1991:254, paras. 41–45; or (3) must otherwise fall within the scope of EU law
because some specific substantive rule of EU law is applicable to the situation, for instance
because the national measure potentially hinders free movement, as in the Judgment in
Karner, C-71/02, EU:C:2004:181, paras. 48–53.
14 See further P. Eeckhout, “Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law: Pluralism or
Integration?,” Current Legal Problems 66 (2013), 169–202 [175–180].
15 Eckes, “EU Accession,” p. 280. Advocate General Jacobs put it as follows in his opinion in
Bosphorus (C-84/95, EU:C:1996:179, point 53): “Although the [Union] itself is not a party
to the Convention . . . and although the Convention may not be formally binding upon
the [Union], nevertheless for practical purposes the Convention can be regarded as part
of [Union] law and can be invoked as such both in this Court and in national courts
where [Union] law is in issue.”
16 D. Spielmann, “The Judicial Dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights or How to Remain Good Neighbours after the Opinion
2/13,” Speech delivered at FRAME on March 27, 2017 in Brussels, www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/ECHRCJUEdialog.BRUSSELS. final.pdf.
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in so far as the Charter contains rights that “correspond” to rights
guaranteed by the Convention, “the meaning and scope” of the former
shall be the same as those of the latter.17 More importantly, the provision
adds that this “shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection,” thus making use of the leeway that Article 53 of the Con-
vention leaves to contracting parties to lay down higher standards of
protection of fundamental rights. In this way, the Charter treats the
Convention as laying down the minimum standard below which the
protection offered by the Charter may not fall.18 As a baseline, Article
53 of the Charter adds a sort of standstill clause according to which the
Charter must never be interpreted as setting a lower level of protection
than what European Union law, international law, the Convention,
and member states’ constitutions required on December 1, 2009.19 This
means that it falls to the CJEU to determine in a concrete case whether
European Union legislation or a national measure implementing Euro-
pean Union law violates the Convention or simply goes above and
beyond. That determination is particularly difficult to make when two
or more rights must be balanced against each other, presenting a risk of
conflict between the CJEU and the ECtHR. Taken together, these provi-
sions give the CJEU some margin of maneuver to shield European Union
law from the Convention.
In this connection, it is worth remembering that Luxembourg’s mis-
sion differs from Strasbourg’s: where the latter strives to lay down
minimum standards for the 47 parties to the Convention, the former
seeks to ensure the primacy, effectiveness, and uniformity of European
Union law. Hence, the ECtHR may, on the basis of Article 53 ECHR,
leave a European Union member state free to provide more extensive
protection – by setting a more demanding standard for what constitutes a
fair trial, for instance – whereas the CJEU will deny that member state
the freedom to deviate from the balance that a particular instrument of
European Union law has struck between competing fundamental rights,
17 The Explanations to the Charter set out which rights “correspond” to each other.
18 On the relationship between the Charter and the Convention as prescribed by Articles
52 and 53 of the Charter, see K. Lenaerts, “The Court of Justice of the European Union
and the Protection of Fundamental Rights,” Polish Yearbook of International Law 31
(2011), 79–106 [98–104].
19 See the explanations to Article 53 of the Charter, C303/05 (“This provision is intended
to maintain the level of protection currently afforded”) and K. Lenaerts, “Die
EU-Grundrechtencharta: Anwendbarkeit und Auslegung,” Europarecht 47 (2012), 3–16
[13 and note 49].
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even by setting a standard of protection that is just barely higher than the
ECHR minimum standard. As Melloni demonstrates, where a situation
falls within the scope of European Union law, national courts may be
required to deny individuals the benefit of more demanding constitu-
tional guarantees in the interest of the primacy, effectiveness, and uni-
formity of the lower common denominator set by European Union
secondary law. The CJEU’s role is that of a federal constitutional and
supreme court, not that of a second supranational human rights court.
Conversely, while European Union acts as such cannot be challenged
before the ECtHR,20 this does not prevent the Strasbourg court from
adjudicating cases involving the European Union. Because the European
Union is not a party to the Convention, that court lacks personal
jurisdiction to consider applications against the supranational organiza-
tion.21 It also rejects applications that aim to establish the individual
or joint responsibility of European Union member states for European
Union measures unless they involve some sort of positive action by the
state on their territory, thus meeting the jurisdictional requirement
posed by Article 1 of the Convention.22 For this reason, the Court
dismissed the application of a former European Union official against
the (then) 15 European Union member states claiming that the annul-
ment procedure in which he had challenged his dismissal before the
CJEU violated Article 6 of the Convention because it did not allow him
to respond to the opinion of the advocate general.23 That said, in
Kokkelvisserij,24 Strasbourg significantly relaxed this requirement by
suggesting that the mere act of requesting a preliminary ruling from
the CJEU, by a state court, suffices to examine that state’s responsibility
for defects in the preliminary ruling procedure. Moreover, in Gaspar-
ini,25 which concerned an employment dispute between the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and an employee, the ECtHR
even seems to have completely abandoned the requirement for the state
to act, holding that the fact that the applicant alleged a “structural
lacuna” in NATO’s internal dispute-settlement mechanism entitled it
to examine the state’s Convention responsibility. The upshot is that an
20 Judgment in Matthews v. UK, Application No. 24833/94, para. 32.
21 European Human Rights Commission, Confédération Française Démocratique du Trav-
ail v. the European Communities, Application No. 8030/77.
22 Douglas-Scott, “The Court of Justice of the European Union,” p. 154.
23 ECtHR, Judgment in Connolly v. 15 Member States of the EU, Application No. 73274/01.
24 ECtHR, Judgment in Kokkelvisseri v. The Netherlands, Application No. 13645/05.
25 ECtHR, Judgment in Gasparini v. Italy, Application No. 10750/03.
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applicant must either show that a member state directly or indirectly
intervened in a European Union act or assert a structural lacuna in its
internal dispute-settlement mechanism.26
In any event, when a jurisdictional nexus is present, the ECtHR may
consider all acts and omissions of contracting parties and their organs,
regardless of whether they were a consequence of domestic law or of the
necessity to comply with international legal obligations.27 In other words,
a European Union member state is not absolved from its Convention
responsibility in the areas in which it has transferred power to the
European Union,28 as this would allow it to determine the extent of
its obligations at will, undermining the Convention’s effectiveness.29 The
Strasbourg court thus has jurisdiction to consider the legality of an action
by a European Union member state even though that action originates in
European Union law, which means that it may indirectly judge on the
compatibility of European Union acts with the Convention.
Thus, in Bosphorus, the ECtHR saw no jurisdictional bar to consider-
ing whether the Irish authorities had violated Article 1 of the First
Additional Protocol to the Convention by impounding an aircraft on
Irish territory, notwithstanding the fact that Ireland was merely imple-
menting a European Union regulation.30 This, however, risks putting
a European Union member state in a dilemma between its loyalty
to European Union law and compliance with the Convention. In effect,
European Union law requires it to justify the actions or omissions for
which it risks incurring Convention responsibility by relying on its
26 C. Reyngaert, “The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to the Responsibility of
Member States in Connection with Acts of International Organizations,” International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 60 (2011), 997–1016 [1005].
27 ECtHR, Judgment in Bosphorus v. Ireland, Application No. 45036/98, para. 153.
28 See already Matthews v. UK, para. 32, which concerned the individual liability of a
European Union member state for European Union primary law in the adoption of
which it was involved. The ECtHR has also considered several cases in which the
collective responsibility of all European Union member states for European Union acts
or omissions was asserted, although it never imposed sanctions. See, e.g., ECtHR,
Judgment in Soc Guérin Automobiles v. 15 EU Member States, Application No. 51717/
99; ECtHR, Judgment in Segi ea and Gestoras Pro Amnestia v. 15 EU Member States,
Application No. 6422/02; ECtHR, Judgment in Senator Lines v. 15 EU Member States,
Application No. 56672/00.
29 Ibid., para. 154. See also Matthews v. UK, para. 22.
30 Bosphorus v. Ireland, paras. 136–138. See also T. Lock, “Beyond Bosphorus: The European
Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the Responsibility of Member States of Inter-
national Organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights,” Human
Rights Law Review 10 (2010), 529–545 [532].
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obligations under the European Union treaties. The result would be that
European Union member states would be held separately or jointly liable
for European Union acts, which undermines the international legal
personality of the European Union.
To avoid this, the Strasbourg Court in Bosphorus installed a rebuttable
presumption that is sensitive to the margin of maneuver (“discretion”)
that European Union rules leave for European Union member states.
Echoing the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Solange jurisprudence and
picking up on the European Human Rights Commission’s 1987 decision
in M. & Co. v. Germany,31 the Court held that “[a]s long as the relevant
organization is considered to protect fundamental rights . . . in a manner
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Con-
vention provides . . . the presumption will be that a State has not
departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no
more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of
the organization.”32 The ECtHR assesses whether a European Union
member state’s acts or omissions are mandated by European Union
law – in which case the presumption of equivalent protection kicks in
and the state is presumed to have complied with the Convention – or
whether European Union rules left them a margin of discretion, in which
case the presumption does not apply and the Court examines whether
the state exercised that discretion in a Convention-compliant manner. It
is worth adding that, since Michaud v. France, the Court has added an
additional condition: The application of the presumption of equivalent
protection requires not just the absence of any margin of maneuver on
the part of the domestic authorities but also “the full deployment of the
supervisory mechanism provided for by European Union law.”33
Thus, in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece – a judgment that dates from
before Michaud – the Court held that the so-called sovereignty clause in
Article 3(2) of European Union Regulation 343/2003 (the Dublin
31 European Commission of Human Rights, M. & Co. v. Germany, Application No. 13258/
87, D.R. No. 64, p. 138 (“the Convention does not prohibit a Member State from
transferring powers to international organisations”.) Nonetheless, the commission recalls
that “if a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently concludes another inter-
national agreement which disables it from performing its obligations under the first treaty
it will be answerable for any resulting breach of its obligations under the earlier treaty.”
32 Bosphorus v. Ireland, paras. 155–156.
33 ECtHR, Judgment in Michaud v. France, Application No. 12323/11, paras. 114–115. The
Court repeated that condition in its Judgment in Avotiņš v. Latvia, Application
No. 17502/07, paras. 105 and 109–112.
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Regulation) allowed Belgium to refrain from transferring the applicant to
Greece, where he ran a real risk of being subject to treatment contrary to
Article 3 of the Convention.34 Because the measure under review there-
fore “did not strictly fall within Belgium’s international legal obligations,”
the presumption of equivalent protection did not apply. Conversely, in
Avotiņš v. Latvia, the ECtHR found that Article 34(2) of the Brussels
I Regulation, as construed by the CJEU “in a fairly extensive body of case-
law,” did not confer any discretion on national courts in deciding
whether to issue a declaration of enforceability.35 Moreover, that the
Latvian Supreme Court had not made a reference for a preliminary ruling
to the CJEU did not mean that the supervisory mechanism provided by
European Union law had not been fully deployed, as Michaud pre-
scribed.36 Thus, the Bosphorus presumption applied.
Importantly, the Court in Bosphorus held that, even when the pre-
sumption applies, it may be rebutted if “in the circumstances of a
particular case, [the Court finds] that the protection of Convention rights
was manifestly deficient.”37 On its face, this formulation conveys that
the ECtHR checks, every time it applies the presumption, whether the
substantive and procedural guarantees afforded by the European Union
legal system in a concrete case meet some sort of minimum standard
derived from the Convention. Later judgments, however, suggest that the
standard of review is even more deferential as the ECtHR merely makes a
“wholesale”38 assessment of the judicial protection of fundamental rights
in the European Union and will see no need to consider the presumption
rebutted unless those guarantees deteriorate across the board.
Moreover, in Avotiņš v. Latvia, the ECtHR has again nuanced the
Bosphorus presumption by holding that “if a serious and substantiated
complaint is raised before [a domestic court] to the effect that the protec-
tion of a Convention right has been manifestly deficient and that this
situation cannot be remedied by European Union law, [that court] cannot
34 ECtHR, Judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, para. 365.
35 Avotiņš v. Latvia, para. 106.
36 Ibid., paras. 109–111. See P. Gragl, “An Olive Branch from Strasbourg? Interpreting the
European Court of Human Rights’ Resurrection of Bosphorus and Reaction to Opinion 2/
13 in the Avotiņš Case,” European Constitutional Law Review 13 (2017), 551–567 [557].
37 Bosphorus v. Ireland, para. 156.
38 See D. Halberstam, “‘It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on
EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward,” German Law Journal 16 (2015) 1,
105–146 [131–134], who calls the distinction one between a “wholesale” and a “retail”
examination of fundamental rights violations.
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refrain from examining that complaint on the sole ground that [it is]
applying EU law.”39 This case concerned a Latvian court that, under the
Brussels I Regulation, had no margin to deny granting an enforcement
award of a judgment delivered by a Cypriot judge, even though there were
fundamental rights objections to doing so. According to Spielmann, the
judgment confirms the continued validity of the Bosphorus presumption
post–Opinion 2/13 but also sends a clear signal that it should not be taken
for granted, that is, that the ECtHR is eager to scrutinize the decisions of
domestic courts implementing European Union law.40
It is worth remarking that even outside the narrow set of cases where it
is asked indirectly to consider the compatibility of European Union acts
with the Convention, the Strasbourg court explicitly or implicitly deals
with European Union law more often than one would surmise.41 Next
to the aforementioned cases of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and Avotiņš
v. Latvia, one may think of the line of cases in which the Court was asked
whether the refusal of a national court to refer a reference for preliminary
ruling to the CJEU amounts to a violation of Article 6 ECHR,42 or of
Karoussiotis, which required it to determine whether the fact that the
European Commission had already started infringement proceedings
against Portugal rendered an application inadmissible under Article 35
(2)(b) of the Convention.43
39 Avotiņš v. Latvia, para. 116.
40 Spielmann, “The Judicial Dialogue,” p. 15. However, Reyngaert, in “Oscillating between
Embracing and Avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights on Member
State Responsibility for Acts of International Organisations and the Case of the EU,”
European Law Review 39 (2014), 176–192 [191], has observed that the ECtHR has
traditionally been reluctant to second-guess the human rights adequacy of the internal
procedures of other international organizations, in particular the European Union. The
Court is wont to avoid being drawn into this difficult exercise by taking it as a given that
the European Union offers equivalent protection or by finding that there either was no
positive action by a member state or that European Union law left the member state a
certain margin of discretion.
41 C. Eckes, “EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaption,” Modern Law
Review 76 (2013), 254–285 [260–262]; S. Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of Two Courts: Luxem-
bourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis,” Common Market
Law Review 43 (2006), 629–665 [631].
42 See, for instance, ECtHR, judgments in Dhahbi v. Italy, Application No. 17120/09;
Schipani and Others v. Italy, Application No. 38369/09; Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek,
Application Nos. 3989/07 and 38353/07 and Ferreira, Application No. 30123/10. See
further C. Lacchi, “The ECtHR’s Interference in the Dialogue between National Courts
and the Court of Justice of the EU: Implications for the Preliminary Reference Proced-
ure,” Review of European Administrative Law 8 (2015), 95–125.
43 ECtHR, Judgment in Karoussiotis v. Portugal, Application No. 23205/08.
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To summarize, the ground rules of engagement between Luxembourg
and Strasbourg are based on a nuanced reading of the Bosphorus formula.
It becomes clear, however, that the present situation, whereby the Euro-
pean Union is not a contracting party to the Convention, gives rise not
only to an additional layer of jurisdictional complexity but also leaves an
accountability gap. While the adoption of the Charter has remedied that
to some extent, the European Union remains shielded from external
scrutiny, which means that there is still a gap between what the European
Union requires from others – notably through the Copenhagen criteria –
and what it does.44 For that reason, the Lisbon Treaty made accession
constitutionally required.45
The Impact of Opinion 2/13
The European Union’s long-planned accession to the Convention was
dealt a significant blow in December 2014, when the CJEU held in
Opinion 2/13 that the Draft Agreement between the 47 member states
of the Council of Europe and the European Union was fundamentally
incompatible with European Union primary law. The Court saw four
constitutional issues with accession as envisaged by the agreement.46
First, it would upset the autonomy and specific characteristics of Euro-
pean Union law because the agreement (1) did nothing to prevent
member states from departing from the level of protection provided for
by the Charter or from otherwise compromising the primacy, unity, and
effectiveness of European Union law by relying on Article 53 ECHR,
which allows them to lay down higher standards of protection of funda-
mental rights than those guaranteed by the Convention;47 (2) failed to
safeguard the principle of mutual trust between European Union
44 E. Spaventa, “A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the
European Union after Opinion 2/13,” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law 22 (2015), 35–56 [43] and, discussing the reasons for accession more generally,
pp. 37–44.
45 Article 6(2) TEU prescribes that “[t]he Union shall accede to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
46 The Court’s touchstone was twofold. On the one hand, Article 6(2), second sentence,
TEU, according to which the accession was not to “affect the Union’s competences as
defined in the Treaties.” On the other hand, Protocol No. 8 relating to Article 6(2)
European Union on the accession of the Union to the ECHR, which demands inter alia
that the agreement “make provision for the preserving the specific characteristics of the
Union and Union law” and not affect Article 344 TFEU.
47 Opinion 2/13, para. 189.
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member states, which meant that member states could be required to
check that another member state has observed fundamental rights as a
matter of course; and (3) would allow circumvention of the preliminary
ruling procedure through the mechanism introduced by Protocol No 16,
through which the highest national courts could request advisory opin-
ions from the ECtHR on rights corresponding to those guaranteed by the
Charter.
Second, accession would affect the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction (as
per Article 344 TFEU) with respect to disputes concerning the interpret-
ation or application of the treaties because the agreement did not exclude
the ECtHR from hearing disputes between member states or between
member states and the European Union that concerned the application
of the Convention but also fell within the scope ratione materiae of
European Union law. Third, the corespondent mechanism would involve
the ECtHR applying and interpreting the rules of European Union law
governing the division of powers between the member states and the
Union, and the CJEU’s prior involvement would not allow it to rule on
the interpretation of secondary European Union law. Finally, because the
CJEU does not have full jurisdiction over matters relating to the Euro-
pean Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, accession would
confer jurisdiction to carry out a judicial review of the European Union’s
acts and omissions in the light of fundamental rights exclusively on an
international court outside the European Union institutional framework.
As the Court had already held in Opinion 1/09, that would alter the
essential character of the powers that the treaties confer on the European
Union institutions and on the member states and that are essential to the
preservation of the very nature of European Union law.48
Many scholars have lambasted Opinion 2/13 for being focused more
“on protecting [the Court’s] own prerogatives than [on] protecting
fundamental rights or even the EU constitutional structure.”49 Eeckhout,
48 CJEU, Opinion 1/09, EU:C:2011:123, paras. 78, 80, and 89.
49 Spaventa, “A Very Fearful Court,” p. 56 (parenthesis removed). For further criticism, see,
e.g., “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ!,” CMLRev 52 (2015), 1–16;
S. Peers, “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare,” German
Law Journal 16 (2015) 1, 213–222; P. Eeckhout, “Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the
ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky,” Fordham International Law
Journal 38 (2015), 955–992; B. de Witte and S. Imamović, “Opinion 2/13 on Accession
to the ECHR: Defending the EU Legal Order against a Foreign Human Rights Court,”
European Law Review 40 (2015) 5, 683–705. See also the numerous blog posts written in
the days after the opinion: T. Lock, “Oops! We Did it Again – the CJEU’s Opinion on EU
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for instance, argues that the CJEU has looked for problems that are not
there: The fact that the accession agreement permits something whereas
European Union law forbids it should not necessarily be viewed as an
incompatibility.50 That Article 53 ECHR allows contracting parties to set
higher standards of fundamental rights protection whereas the European
Union Charter imposes a uniform standard of protection on European
Union member states (which must not fall below the level set by the
Convention) is only problematic if one adopts an exceptionally wide
conception of conflict.51 Similarly, that member states are subject to the
CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction whereas the Convention would still allow
intra–European Union conflicts to be brought before the ECtHR is not
really incompatible with Article 344 TFEU.52 De Witte and Imamović
similarly emphasize that the CJEU’s approach is “overly strict” where it
takes issue with the plausibility review carried out by the ECtHR’s under
the corespondent mechanism, simply because this would mean that the
ECtHR would have to interpret European Union primary law with
respect to the division of competences, even though it would not lead
to a binding interpretation of those rules as a matter of European Union
law.53 Spaventa is critical of the CJEU’s stance with respect to the
Common Foreign and Security Policy because the Court prefers to accept
that an individual be entirely devoid of judicial protection over having
another body review European Union compliance with an international
treaty.54 Other scholars, notably Halberstam, have maintained that the
CJEU has a number of valid concerns, which are solvable either unilat-
erally or by small changes to the agreement.55 That said, the majority of
Accession to the ECHR,” Verfassungsblog, December 18, 2014, www.verfassungsblog.de/
en/oops-das-gutachten-des-eugh-zum-emrk-beitritt-der-eu/; W. Michl, “Thou Shalt
Have No Other Courts before Me,” Verfassungsblog, December 23, 2014, www.verfas
sungs blog.de/en/thou-shalt-no-courts/; A. O’Neill, “Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession
to the ECHR: The CJEU as Humpty Dumpty,” Eutopialaw, December 18, 2014),
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/12/18/opinion-213-on-eu-accession-to-the-echr-the-cjeu-
as-humpty-dumpty/; S. Peers, “The CJEU and the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: A Clear
and Present Danger to Human Rights Protection,” EU Law Analysis, December 18, 2014,
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.no/2014/12/the-cjeu- and-eus-accession-to-echr.html.
50 Eeckhout, “Opinion 2/13,” p. 967.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 974.
53 de Witte and Imamović, “Opinion 2/13,” pp. 697–698.
54 Spaventa, “A Very Fearful Court,” p. 53.
55 Halberstam, “A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13,” p. 105.
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analysts agree that the possibility of accession has become more
remote,56 and several of them are pessimistic about the continuation of
judicial dialogue between the CJEU and the ECtHR.57 We show, how-
ever, that recent judgments like Aranyosi,58 H v. Council,59 and Rosneft60
appear to signal a willingness on the part of the CJEU to iron out the
differences that it listed in Opinion 2/13.61 Even if the sacrosanct formula
of preserving the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of European Union
law might have been a valid concern on the part of the Luxembourg
judges (as pointed out by Halberstam), this chapter examines the CJEU’s
demonstrated ability to nuance and even compromise core principles of
European Union law to cooperate with Strasbourg. Simultaneously, we
discuss the ways in which the ECtHR explicitly and implicitly continues
to enforce European Union law. Taken together, these two strings of case
law interpretation provide a springboard for the argument that we
advance here – namely, that the two courts are under a legal obligation
to cooperate.
Jurisprudential Cross-Fertilization
The ECtHR’s and the CJEU’s competing jurisdictions have coexisted in a
productive fashion for years. It has frequently been observed that their
interaction is characterized by a tendency to avoid open conflicts about
the scope of fundamental rights and a preference for “judicial dia-
logue.”62 In the main, the two courts show great respect for each other’s
56 Spaventa, “A Very Fearful Court,” p. 56.
57 Eeckhout, “Opinion 2/13,” p. 990 (“the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR is
unlikely to return to the past golden years of mutual respect and cooperation, let alone
admiration. It will be difficult for Strasbourg not to look at [Opinion 2/13] as a rejection
of its core judicial function: to serve as an external control organ for human rights
violations in Europe”). More optimistically, see F. Fabbrini and J. Larik, “The Past,
Present and Future of the Relation between the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights,” Yearbook of European Law 35 (2016) 1, 145–179.
58 CJEU, Judgment in Aranyosi, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198.
59 CJEU, Judgment in H v. Council, C-455/14 P, EU:C:2016:569.
60 CJEU, Judgment in Rosneft, C-72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paras. 62–81.
61 See J. Snell, “Is Opinion 2/13 Obsolescent?,” European Law Review 42 (2017), 449–450.
62 See, e.g., Spielmann, “The Judicial Dialogue”; Fabbrini and Larik, “The Past, Present and
Future”; T. Lock, The European Court of Justice and International Courts (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 167 ff. Gragl, “An Olive Branch from
Strasbourg”; Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of Two Courts.” On judicial dialogue generally, see
Eeckhout, “Opinion 2/13,” p. 955; A-M. Slaughter, “A Global Community of Courts,”
Harvard International Law Journal 44 (2003), 191–219.
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decisions and have demonstrated a degree of deference toward one
another. This does not mean that there are no inconsistencies between
the case law of Strasbourg, on the one hand, and that of Luxembourg, on
the other,63 or that incompatibilities are swept under the carpet in the
name of good neighborly relations. Rather, the decisions of both courts
leave room for mutual accommodation. Where conflicts occur, they are
often presented as an opportunity for convergence, as spurring a race to
the top. Thus, as Fabbrini and Larik recently put it, the ECtHR and the
CJEU are engaged in a “virtuous competition,”64 mutually influencing
each other’s decisions.
A conspicuous sign of this mutual influence is the citing of one
another’s case law, even where there is no jurisdictional overlap. Such
references are much more common in judgments of the CJEU, simply
because it has considered itself bound by the ECHR since the 1970s. That
said, while the Luxembourg court referred to the Convention as early as
1975,65 it took until 1996 for that court to rely explicitly on the case law
of its brethren in Strasbourg.66 The latter, by contrast, had already made
a reference to a CJEU judgment as early as 1979, in its landmark
judgment in Marckx v. Belgium, and started invoking the European
Union Charter as persuasive authority in 2002, even before the CJEU
first relied on it.67 Still, the ECtHR has only sporadically cited Luxem-
bourg case law,68 probably because it is the court exclusively adjudicating
63 For a good (though already somewhat dated) overview, see J. Callewaert, “The European
Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law: A Long Way to Harmony,”
European Human Rights Law Review (2009), 768–783. See earlier D. Spielmann, “Human
Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies,
and Complementarities,” in P. Alston, M. Bustelo, and J. Heenan (eds.), The EU and
Human Rights (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 757–780
[766].
64 Fabbrini and Larik, “The Past, Present and Future,” pp. 174–175 and, more generally,
F. Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
65 CJEU, Judgment in Rutili, 36/75, EU:C:1975:137, para. 32.
66 CJEU, Judgment in P v. S, C-13/94, EU:C:1996:170, para. 16. As Douglas-Scott observes,
this is somewhat ironic given that the Court had just held that the European Union
lacked competence to accede to the Convention in Opinion 2/94, EU:C:1996:140.
67 ECtHR, Goodwin v. UK, Application No. 28957/95, para. 100; CJEU, Judgment in Jégo-
Quéré, C-263/02 P, EU:C:2004:210, para. 47. The CFI – now the General Court – was
earlier to mention the Charter, see CFI, Judgment in Max.mobil, T-54/99, EU:T:2002:20,
para. 48.
68 See, e.g., ECtHR, Judgment in Posti and Rakho v. Finland, Application No. 27824/95,
para. 53; ECtHR, Judgment in Nada v. Switzerland, Application No. 10593/08, para. 212
(referring to the CJEU, Judgment in Kadi, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461,
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on human rights, and fundamental rights decisions were relatively rare in
Luxembourg for a long time.69
With the adoption of the Charter, however, this all seems to be
changing. The absence of references to the Convention or to Strasbourg
decisions in more recent CJEU jurisprudence is notable.70 Vice versa,
the ECtHR has started to cite CJEU case law more frequently since the
Charter became binding. As Dean Spielmann, the former president of the
ECtHR and now judge at the General Court of the European Union has
noted, this is explained by the reasons that initially prompted both
supranational courts to interact with the case law of one another. The
CJEU now no longer needs to refer to the judgments of the ECtHR to
legitimize its own case law or the autonomy of European Union law vis-
à-vis national constitutional courts, while, to the ECtHR, “referring to EU
law offered a basis to show contemporary consensus and modernize the
interpretation of the Convention,”71 which it has consistently held is “a
living instrument, to be interpreted in present-day conditions.”72
The same considerations are at stake when it comes to substantive
cross-fertilization between the CJEU and the ECtHR. Strasbourg takes
advantage of the Charter and the jurisprudence of the CJEU to update its
construction of Convention rights, raising the bar of fundamental rights
protection. Luxembourg pays close attention to Strasbourg’s decisions
not just because Article 52 of the Charter and Article 6 TEU require it but
para. 299 for the proposition that “the principles governing the international legal order
under the United Nations” do not exclude all forms of judicial review of the internal
lawfulness of an European Union regulation merely because that measure is intended to
give effect to a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
and applying it mutatis mutandis in the context of the Convention); ECtHR, Judgment in
Scoppolla v. Italy (No. 2), Application No. 10249/03, paras. 105–106 (referring to CJEU,
Judgment in Berlusconi, C-387/02, C-391/02, and C-403/02, EU:C:2005:270) as proof
that a consensus had emerged that the retroactivity of the more lenient penalty was a
fundamental principle of criminal law).
69 Douglas-Scott, “The Court of Justice of the European Union,” p. 158. Moreover, as
Spielmann has observed, before the advent of the Charter, when the CJEU dealt with
fundamental rights issues – usually in the context of free movement law – it tended to
leave much to the national court (Spielmann, “Human Rights Case Law”). This hesitation
arguably made those judgments less interesting to the Strasbourg court.
70 Compare, for instance, the Judgment in Akzo Nobel, C-550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512 with the
opinion of the Advocate General Kokott in that case (EU:C:2010:229).
71 Spielmann, “The Judicial Dialogue,” p. 11.
72 ECtHR, Judgment in Tyrer v. UK, Application No. 5856/72, para. 31. See also ECtHR,
Judgment (Preliminary Objection) in Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89,
paras. 71–73.
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also to retain its legitimacy in the eyes of national constitutional courts.73
It must be added here that, as the cases dealing with the Dublin Regula-
tion and the European Arrest Warrant have demonstrated,74 the CJEU’s
concern for fundamental rights is somewhat attenuated by what the
Court understands to be its primary mission: ensuring the uniformity,
primacy, and effectiveness of Union law in general, and upholding the
system of mutual recognition (in turn based on mutual trust!) in particu-
lar.75 Although the ECtHR shows a remarkable degree of deference to the
demands of European Union law, these cases illustrate why full compli-
ance with the Convention may represent a challenge to the CJEU.
That said, there are many examples of the Luxembourg court adapting
its case law in view of a decision of the Strasbourg court, and vice versa.
The most radical example is Spain v. UK, where the CJEU sanctioned UK
legislation that departed from European Union primary law because
said legislation was adopted to comply with the ECtHR’s judgment in
Matthews v. UK.76 Similarly, in Roquette Frères,77 in a reaction to the
ECtHR’s decision on the scope of Article 8 ECHR in Niemietz
v. Germany,78 the CJEU altered its definition of the “home” as set out
in Hoechst79 so as to encompass not just private but also business
premises. In N.S., the Luxembourg court introduced an exception to
the principle of mutual trust underpinning the Dublin Regulation in
response to M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. In the latter decision, the
Strasbourg court had found that Belgium had infringed Article 3 ECHR
by sending the applicant, an asylum seeker, to Greece, and thus exposing
him to the risks linked to the systemic deficiencies in the asylum proced-
ures of that member state and to the detention and appalling living
conditions there, in breach of that provision. In N.S., the CJEU held that
73 See, e.g., the Order of 15 December 2015 of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case
2 BvR 2735/14 (“European Arrest Warrant II”), See T. Reinbacher and M. Wendel,
“The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s European Arrest Warrant II Decision,” Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law 23 (2016), 702–713.
74 See in particular CJEU, Judgment in N.S., C-411/10 and C-493/10, EU:C:2011:865;
Melloni, para. 60.
75 See further T. Van den Sanden, “Case Note Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S.
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,” Columbia Journal of European Law 19
(2013), 143–174.
76 CJEU, Judgment in Spain v. UK, C-145/04, EU:C:2006:543, paras. 60, 90 and 95;
Matthews v. UK.
77 CJEU, Judgment in Roquette Frères, C-94/00, EU:C:2002:603, para. 29.
78 ECtHR, Judgment in Niemietz v. Germany, Application No. 13710/88.
79 CJEU, Judgment in Hoechst, 46/87 and 227/88, EU:C:1989:337.
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a member state must not transfer an asylum seeker to the “responsible
Member State” within the meaning of the Dublin Regulation “where they
cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure
and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State
amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would
face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment
within the meaning of that provision.”80 This formulation suggested that
the mutual trust principle, so central to the Dublin system, would only
temporarily cease to apply where there were generalized, serious, and
widespread problems with the asylum system in a member state. How-
ever, in Aranyosi, which did not concern the transfer of an asylum seeker
under the Dublin system but the surrender of a detainee to another
member state following a European Arrest Warrant, the CJEU slightly
but fundamentally reformulated the exception, arguably to bring it more
in line with the decisions inM.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and Tarakhel,81
which laid down a criterion of “individual risk” rather than “systemic
risk.” According to Aranyosi,82 deficiencies need not necessarily be
systemic or generalized; what is most important is that there is a “real
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of the general condi-
tions of detentions” and,83 if so, that the national court makes “a specific
and precise [assessment] of whether there are substantial grounds to
believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk.”84
Despite the strong language used in Opinion 2/13, about the importance
of protecting the principle of mutual trust against the detrimental impact
of accession to the Convention (in the form envisaged by the Draft
Agreement),85 both judgments show that the CJEU has been willing to
nuance, and even compromise, one of the core principles of European
Union law to meet the substantive demands posed by the Convention.86
80 N.S., para. 106 (emphasis added).
81 ECtHR, Judgment in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12, paras. 102–104.
82 Aranyosi, paras. 88 and 91–94.
83 Ibid., para. 88.
84 Ibid., para. 91.
85 Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 191–194.
86 See further K. Lenaerts, “La Vie Après l’Avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not
Blind) Trust,” CMLRev 54 (2017), 805–840; F. Korenica and D. Doli, “No More Uncon-
ditional ‘Mutual Trust’ between the Member States: An Analysis of the Landmark
Decision of the CJEU in Aranyosi and Caldararu,” European Human Rights Law Review
(2016), 542–555.
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In turn, the ECtHR has borrowed from the CJEU on several occasions.
For instance, in Stec and Others v. United Kingdom, it effectively followed
a CJEU decision in finding the difference in national pensionable age
between men and women to pursue a legitimate aim and to be reasonably
and objectively justified. The ECtHR explicitly mentioned that “particu-
lar regard should be had to the strong persuasive value of the ECJ’s
finding on this point.”87 In Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), the Strasbourg court
invoked Article 47 of the European Union Charter to revise its case law
on Article 7 ECHR and cited the CJEU’s Berlusconi judgment to prove
that a consensus had arisen that the retroactivity of the more lenient
penalty was a fundamental principle of criminal law.
The mutual influence between the two courts is even clearer when the
ECtHR deals with European Union law and thereby contributes directly
to its development. A good example of this is the long line of cases in
which the Strasbourg court is asked to review a national court’s failure to
make a reference for a preliminary ruling in the light of Article 6
ECHR.88 Although such a ground for review might raise concern with
the CJEU (because the ECtHR is not concerned with ensuring the
primacy and uniformity of European Union law but only with safeguard-
ing fundamental rights) the Strasbourg court has diligently examined the
domestic court’s refusal to refer in the light of the CJEU’s CILFIT
judgment.89 It has consistently held that Article 6(1) ECHR may be
infringed due to the arbitrary refusal of a request of a party in the
national proceedings asking the domestic court to make a reference to
the CJEU. In Dhahbi v. Italy and Schipani and Others v. Italy,90 the
ECtHR has found a violation of that provision for the first time because
the Italian Court of Cassation had refused to make a reference without
stating the reasons for its refusal. This ECtHR case law implicitly
reinforces the CJEU’s jurisprudence on Article 267 TFEU.
In yet other cases, the ECtHR explicitly reinforces European Union law.
For instance, the Strasbourg court has held on several occasions that the
cooperation between the national courts of European Union member
states, on the one hand, and the CJEU, on the other, is of great importance
87 ECtHR, Judgment in Stec and Others v. UK, Application Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01,
para. 58.
88 See C. Lacchi, “The ECrtHR’s Interference in the Dialogue between National Courts and
the Court of Justice of the EU: Implications for the Preliminary Reference Procedure,”
Review of European Administrative Law 8 (2015), 95–125.
89 CJEU, Judgment in CILFIT, 77/83, EU:C:1984:91.
90 Dhahbi v. Italy, paras. 31–34 and Schipani and Others v. Italy, paras. 69–73.
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for the protection of fundamental rights.91 By both implicitly and expli-
citly reinforcing European Union law, the ECtHR de facto enforces the
European Union law principle of sincere cooperation through the Con-
vention. Similarly, in its judgment in Avotiņš v. Latvia – the ECtHR’s
reaction to Opinion 2/13, discussed previously – Strasbourg held that
“where the courts of a State which is both a Contracting Party to the
Convention and aMember State of the European Union are called upon to
apply a mutual recognition mechanism established by EU law, they must
give full effect to that mechanism where the protection of Convention
rights cannot be considered manifestly deficient.”92 This friendly formu-
lation, by which the ECtHR acknowledges the importance of the European
Union law principle of mutual trust and enforces it, as mediated by the
Convention, may be viewed as an olive branch to the Luxembourg court.93
The practice of the ECtHR to reinforce European Union law using the
toolkit of the Convention shows that the fears expressed by the CJEU in
Opinion 2/13 might indeed be overstated.
Finally, the case law on the judicial review of UN sanctions provides
perhaps the best example of cross-fertilization in the true sense of the
word. In the Kadi (I and II) and Nada v. Switzerland cases, the two courts
“drew from each other’s example, and simultaneously pushed each other
to adopt even more expansive human rights approaches.”94 In Kadi, the
CJEU famously held that international law did not bar it from reviewing
with European Union fundamental rights the compatibility of an
European Union regulation that implemented a UN Security Council
resolution laying down sanctions (the review was not limited to jus cogens,
as the General Court had held).95 In Nada v. Switzerland, the ECtHR
explicitly relied on that passage fromKadi to hold that UN sanctions could
not ride roughshod over the guarantees offered by the Convention.96
Moreover, it added that the contracting parties have several positive
91 See, e.g., Michaud v. France, paras. 110–111.
92 Avotiņš v. Latvia, para. 116.
93 More hesitant, see Gragl, “An Olive Branch from Strasbourg,” p. 565 (awarding less
importance to the CJEU’s judgment in Aranyosi and underlining that Strasbourg requires
member states to play a more active role in examining compliance with fundamental
rights than Luxembourg does when it asks domestic courts automatically to recognize or
enforce decisions originating in another member state).
94 Fabrinni and Larik, “The Past, Present and Future,” pp. 175–176.
95 CJEU, Kadi, paras. 285, 288, 306–308, and 326. Compare with CFI, Judgment in Kadi,
T-315/01, EU:T:2005:332, paras. 226–231. Interestingly, even in Kadi, the CJEU already
relied on Strasbourg case law.
96 Nada v. Switzerland, para. 212.
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obligations, notably to try and delist individuals who have been cleared in
domestic terrorism–related investigations or to offer them assistance in
requesting an exemption for health reasons from the UN Sanctions Com-
mittee.97 In turn, in Kadi II, the CJEU, ignoring warnings from the
advocate general to attenuate its rash view on the relationship between
the UN Charter and human rights,98 doubled down on its first judgment
by deciding that unless they are willing or able to fully disclose all evidence
against them, the European Union institutions must delist individuals
(“disclose or delist”).99 This example of cross-fertilization between both
courts – along with others100 – demonstrates that “the influence the one
exerts on the other is mutual and real.”101
Beyond Comity? The Normative Case for Judicial Dialogue
Is it possible to identify a legal duty, however weak, for both courts to
continue their dialogue? On the European Union side, the Declaration on
Article 6(2) TEU annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon is a small step in that
direction.102 In the terse wording of the Declaration, the Intergovern-
mental Conference “notes the existence of a regular dialogue between the
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of
Human Rights” and concludes by observing that “such dialogue could
be reinforced when the Union accedes to that Convention.” According to
97 Ibid., paras. 187–196.
98 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Kadi II.
99 Kadi II, paras. 111 and 123.
100 Another, earlier illustration, is the ECtHR’s reliance on Article 9 of the European Union
Charter as proof of consensus that the right to marry in Article 12 of the Convention
must be construed to give transsexuals the right to marry a person of the sex to which
they previously belonged (in Goodwin v. UK, para. 100). The CJEU later relied on that
judgment in holding that national legislation preventing transsexuals from fulfilling the
marriage requirement that must be met for one of them to be able to benefit from a
survivor’s pension – which forms part of the pay of one of them – violated the right to
equal pay for male and female workers enshrined in what is now Article 157 TFEU
(Judgment in K.B., C-117/01, EU:C:2004:7, paras. 33 and 36). S. Iglesias Sánchez called
this a “boomerang effect” (“The Court and the Charter: The Impact of the Entry Into
Force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights,” CMLRev 49
[2012], 1565, 1570), but it might be viewed as cross-fertilization.
101 As a CJEU judge, writing extrajudicially, put it: see C. Timmermans, “The Relationship
between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights,” in A.
Arnull, C. Barnard, M. Dougan, and E. Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States:
Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 151–160 [153].
102 OJ (2016) C 202/337.
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Douglas-Scott, this puts the CJEU and the ECtHR under a political
obligation to continue their dialogue and even intensify it.103 That,
however, leaves unanswered the question whether a legal obligation to
the same effect exists. It might seem that the CJEU must, based on the
text of the Charter, engage with ECtHR case law when applying the
Charter; arguing for the existence of an unwritten legal obligation to
engage in a dialogue would not add anything to the legal obligation
already spelled out in Article 52 of the Charter. However, cases like
N.S., as well as cases emphasizing the European Union’s autonomy,
demonstrate that the CJEU doesn’t always wholeheartedly follow the
case law of the Strasbourg Court. Conversely, the question remains open
as to a legal duty for the ECtHR to cooperate with the CJEU.
Judicial dialogue is usually described as a form of judicial comity, a
label that covers a variety of cooperative practices between judges
(usually) belonging to different legal systems.104 Scholars rely on the
concepts of comity and dialogue to give a descriptive account of how
two courts endeavor to avoid conflict in a situation where it is unsettled
which of both has ultimate authority. That is notably the case (1) in the
relationship between national constitutional courts and the CJEU, both
of whom claim to have the final say over the validity of European
Union law;105 (2) in horizontal conflicts of law situations106 in which
103 Douglas-Scott, “The Court of Justice of the European Union,” p. 160. The Joint Com-
munication from Presidents Costa and Skouris of 24 January 2011 (http://curia.europa
.eu/jcms/upload/ docs/application/pdf/2011–02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf) also mentions
that both courts hold regular meetings and will continue their dialogue with respect to
the issues raised by accession.
104 E. D’Alterio, “From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity: A Judicial Solution to Global
Disorder?,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2011) 2, 394. For a broader
conception of dialogue in Luxembourg and Strasbourg as a legitimizing nexus not only
between courts but also between courts and civil society, and courts and legislatures, see
B. Petkova, “Three Levels of Dialogue in Precedent Formation at the CJEU and ECtHR,”
in K. Dzehtsiarou, T. Konstantinides, T. Lock, and N. O’Meara (eds.), Human Rights
Law in Europe: The Influence, Overlaps and Contradictions of the EU and ECHR
(London: Routledge, 2014), 73–91.
105 M. Claes, “The Validity and Primacy of EU Law and the ‘Cooperative Relationship’
between National Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European
Union,” Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 23 (2016), 151.
106 See, e.g., A. Briggs, “The Principle of Comity in Private International Law,” Collected
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Leiden, The Netherlands and
Boston: Brill, 2012); J. R. Paul, “The Transformation of International Comity,” Law
and Contemporary Problems 71 (2008), 19–38.
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two courts have a plausible claim to jurisdiction; or (3) between the
ECtHR and the CJEU.107
It has become a trope today to label such situations as instances
of “legal pluralism” to make the point that positive law cannot resolve
these conflicts and is unable to create harmony between legal systems.108
Judicial comity, and judicial dialogue in particular, is heralded as the
alternative: It is not a matter of legal rules but of de facto courtesy and
mutual respect between courts that do not stand in hierarchical relation-
ship to each other. While it may not always succeed, its function is to
prevent and mediate the conflict to which pluralism is prone to give rise
and promote harmonization and even integration.109
Judges use different techniques to express comity. Judicial dialogue
typically involves the referencing and mutual consideration of each
other’s decisions as persuasive or even quasi-binding authority with
the aim of “harmonizing judicial solutions.”110 Yet, even the brinkman-
ship of an explicit warning shot addressed at another court that then
responds by accommodating the concerns of the first – while perhaps
raising a few of its own – may qualify as such. Another technique is
giving “full faith and credit” to decisions of “foreign” courts. Such
recognition promotes integration by allowing the laws of two legal
systems to apply simultaneously in the same jurisdiction, with the
effect that rights acquired within one legal system retain their legal
force in the other.111 A last instance of judicial comity worth mention-
ing here involves deferring to the jurisdiction of another court, for
instance because it is better placed to solve the dispute (forum non
conveniens) or in the interest of international cooperation and regional
integration, as the ECtHR does by applying its Bosphorus presumption
or the German Bundesverfassungsgericht through its Solange
doctrine.112
In the context of European Union–ECHR relations, there is a case to
be made that these cooperative practices go beyond mere comity. As
Eeckhout has argued, the national, European Union, and ECHR systems
107 Douglas-Scott, “The Court of Justice of the European Union,” p. 160.
108 Eeckhout, “Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law,” p. 175.
109 E. D’Alterio, “From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity,” International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law 9 (2011), 394–424 [398, 401, 402].
110 Ibid., 402.
111 Ibid., 400–401. See also the references mentioned in note 106.
112 Ibid., 402.
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must be conceived as integrated rather than pluralist,113 which means
that conflicts between the supreme adjudicators of each system take place
within the law. Even if the CJEU and the ECtHR may occasionally differ
on the interpretation or application of the Convention, this does not
warrant the conclusion that there is a deep conflict of ultimate judicial
authority that is not subject to legal argumentation.114 On the one hand,
there are legal rules and principles binding on all the judicial actors
involved that determine the limits of their respective jurisdiction.115 In
case in which they disagree about the interpretation or application of
these rules, such conflicts can be solved through non-adjudicative legal
means, such as constitutional amendment.116 On the other hand, where
courts share jurisdiction – as they are likely to do because the integration
of the national and ECHR system into the European Union system
means that the three systems share norms – conceiving of these three
legal systems as part of an integrated whole imposes, as a matter of
obligation, a true judicial dialogue through which courts may jointly
craft interpretations that fit the various legal systems involved.117Just like
the integration of European Union law into national law requires regular
cooperation between national courts and the CJEU based on the
principle of sincere cooperation,118 the integration of the Convention
113 Eeckhout, “Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law,” 177 ff. To summarize
Eeckhout’s point: post-Lisbon, both the Convention and fundamental rights resulting
from the constitutional traditions common to the member states are fully integrated into
European Union constitutional law. For its part, the European Union Charter does not
diverge from the Convention but carefully regulates its relationship to it in conformity
with Article 53 ECHR, and there even is some integration of the European Union
Charter into ECtHR case law despite the absence of legal links. Conversely, all European
Union human rights law is integrated into national law through the principles of
primacy and direct effect. The picture that emerges is one in which the national and
ECHR fundamental rights systems are integrated into the European Union system,
which remains tributary to the laws of the member states and to the Convention, both





118 See the View of Advocate General Mazák in Melki, C-188/10 and C-189/10, EU:
C:2010:319, point 64 (observing that the preliminary ruling procedure is vital to ensure
the uniform and coherent application of European Union law and requires the CJEU
and national courts to proceed “in a spirit of cooperation and on the basis of mutual
trust and judicial dialogue”). See also K. Lenaerts, “Interlocking Legal Orders in the
European Union and Comparative Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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into European Union law makes dialogue between the CJEU and the
ECtHR mandatory as a matter of law.
As alluded before, that argument might seem somewhat overwrought
in so far as the CJEU is concerned. Does it not suffice that the treaties
explicitly integrate the Convention into the European Union legal order,
which means that the European Union institutions are bound by ECtHR
jurisprudence as a matter of European Union law? This is true to some
extent. Although formally the treaties refer only to the Convention, the
explanations relating to Article 52(3) of the Charter clarify that the
“meaning and scope” of the rights guaranteed by the Convention must
be determined by reference to both the text of the Convention and the
case law of the ECtHR.119 As discussed, this provision requires the
Luxembourg court to follow the case law of the Strasbourg Court to
ensure that corresponding Charter rights afford the same level of protec-
tion, including authorized limitations.120 That being said, neither Article
6 TEU nor Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter clearly spell out a duty for
the Luxembourg court to cooperate with its Strasbourg-based counter-
part and to strive for harmony and coherence between both systems. The
procedural duty to cooperate, for instance by engaging in a constructive
dialogue, goes beyond the simple obligation to comply which, as Opinion
2/13 highlights, is attenuated inter alia by the autonomy of European
Union law.121
When it comes to the ECtHR, that court’s practice of deferring to the
CJEU on matters involving European Union law must arguably be
viewed, not as mere comity but partly as a straightforward consequence
of Strasbourg’s lack of jurisdiction over European Union law, and partly
52 (2013), 873–906 [879 and 882–883], who explains that the dialogue conducted in the
context of the preliminary ruling procedure allows the CJEU to find solutions that do
not unnecessarily upset national sensitivities and thus make the national legal orders
have confidence in the European Union legal order. While European Union law
technically has primacy, it relies on the national courts for its application. To ensure
the effective application of European Union law in the member states, the Court “takes
the pulse” of the national legal systems and, through the comparative method, develops a
compromise solution that is sufficiently common to the member states.
119 Explanations relating to Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ (2007)
C 303/33.
120 Ibid.
121 See also explanations relating to Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ
(2007) C 303/33, which mention the importance of “the autonomy of Union law and
that of the [CJEU].”
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as an obligation to avoid conflict through dialogue. The ECtHR has never
held a European Union member state responsible for European Union
acts stricto sensu. It accomplishes this inter alia by narrowly defining state
action – the jurisdictional nexus required for the ECtHR to examine an
European Union member state’s Convention responsibility for acts and
omissions required by European Union law, by not lightly presuming
that member states transferred powers to the European Union with
the intent to circumvent their obligations under the Convention, and
by setting a high bar for rebutting the presumption of equivalent
protection.122 Rather than as a discretionary decision of the ECtHR not
to exercise its jurisdiction over cases involving European Union law –
comity – this jurisprudence may have to be conceived as evidence that,
on a proper construction of it, the Court’s jurisdiction simply does not
extend that far. After all, as Reyngaert has argued, the ECtHR’s jurisdic-
tion ought to be interpreted in keeping with the generally accepted
international law principle that member states cannot generally be held
liable for the acts of international organizations by virtue of their mem-
bership of that international organization alone.123 This would amount
to a denial of the international legal personality of said international
organization and make its functioning impossible. In other words, the
legitimate and weighty interest in securing the proper functioning of
international organizations, to which the ECtHR referred in
Bosphorus,124 is a principle of international law that imposes legal obli-
gations. Strasbourg’s deferential attitude toward European Union law is
not purely a matter of comity but is grounded in law.
Further support for the claim that the judicial dialogue between the
ECtHR and the CJEU is a matter of obligation may arguably be found in
the principle of systemic integration expressed by Article 31(3)(c) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. That provision, which
is generally considered to be part of customary international law,125
requires the interpreter of a treaty to consider “any relevant rules of
international law applicable in relations between the parties.” It conveys
the objective of system integration (or “systemic harmonization,” as the
122 See Reyngaert, “The European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to the Responsibility
of Member States,” p. 997 et passim.
123 Ibid.
124 Bosphorus v. Ireland, paras. 150–157.
125 O. Dörr, “Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation,” in O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Vienna: Springer, 2012),
p. 521, point 6.
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ECtHR has put it in Al-Dulumi126), according to which all treaties,
whatever their subject matter, are a creation of the international legal
system and their operation is predicated on that fact.127 This gives rise to
a strong presumption against normative conflict128 and an unnecessary
loss of coherence (i.e., fragmentation) of the international legal order.129
Thus, parties to a treaty are presumed not to have intended to act
inconsistently with generally recognized principles of international law
or with previous treaty obligations toward third states.130 This may be
the legal scaffolding that supports an obligation for the ECtHR not to
presume too lightly that the European Union treaties conflict with the
Convention. At the very least, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT puts the CJEU and
the ECtHR under a weak procedural obligation to engage with the ECHR
and European Union law, respectively, and to strive to “avoid conflict in
the interpretation of their own constitutional treaties, so as not to
undermine fundamentally the system on which they are founded.”131
Ultimately, the most intuitive argument for genuine mutual cooper-
ation between the CJEU and the ECtHR does not involve abstract
notions of overlapping jurisdiction or systemic coherence but derives
from the historical links and shared mission of both institutions. The
Council of Europe and the European Union were established to serve
the same general aim of securing peace on a war-torn continent. While it
is often assumed that the latter focused on economic goals and deliber-
ately outsourced human rights protection to the former, De Búrca has
shown that the 1950s framers saw the omission of human rights from
the 1957 treaties as a “pragmatic and strategic interim step,” not as a
“deliberate decision to consign matters of human rights in the
126 ECtHR, Judgment in Al-Dulumi and Montana Management v. Switzerland, Application
No. 5809/08, para. 140.
127 “Fragmentation of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International
Law Commission,” A/CN.4/L.702, at 13–14.
128 M. Koskkeniemi (ed.), “Fragmentation of International Law: Final Report of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission,” A/CN.4/L.682, point 37.
129 K. Ziegler, “Beyond Pluralism and Autonomy: Systemic Harmonization as a Paradigm
for the Interaction of EU Law and International Law,” Yearbook of European Law 35
(2016), 667–711 [685].
130 ICJ, Rights of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections) (Portugal v. India),
ICJ Reports (1957), p. 142. See C. McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention,” International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 54 (2008), 279–320 [311].
131 K. Ziegler, “Autonomy: From Myth to Reality – or Hubris on a Tightrope? EU Law,
Human Rights and International Law,” University of Leicester School of Law Research
Paper No. 15–25, http://papers.ssrn.com, 55–56.
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Community henceforth to the Council of Europe.”132 Indeed, they spe-
cifically envisaged a robust human rights regime and a closely entwined
constitutional relationship between the communities and the ECHR.133
In other words, these sister organizations, which today share the Euro-
pean flag and anthem, were meant jointly to create a sort of European
public order that would prevent member states from backsliding into
fascism or totalitarianism. Fidelity to this idea ultimately provides the
most basic and compelling reason for avoiding unproductive judicial
skirmishes and encouraging good faith cooperation between the Luxem-
bourg and Strasbourg court.
132 G. De Búrca, “The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights
Actor,” American Journal of International Law 105 (2011), 649–693 [692].
133 Ibid., 673.
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